20090414/加拿大须让幼稚的对华关系变得成熟

【加拿大《环球邮报》4月11日文章，原题：加拿大须让幼稚的对华关系变得成熟 】

加拿大人经常回避伸张或遵循实在的外交利益。我们有时倾向于混淆情绪与实质，担心我们需要别国更甚于他们需要我们。反之，我们有时觉得加拿大很重要、很有影响力，超过我们的利益和能力。对中国的态度都存在上述倾向。

加拿大的中国政策的焦点往往在经贸和人权问题这两者间不时摇摆，但在两个问题上都没有多少建设性的对话。中国对世界事务有长远眼光。加拿大对华长远看法应该始于更准确定义我们希望达到的目标以及如何达到目标。

一个良好的开端将是更实质性的经贸伙伴关系。过去10年，尽管双边贸易持续增长，但跟不上中国经济增长的步伐，而且向着有利于中国一方倾斜。一项全面的加中投资条约将填补经济关系的严重空缺。不要忘了，中国可以出于政治及经济考虑选择伙伴。一项加中投资条约将告诉加拿大投资者，经贸关系得到牢固政治关系的支撑，不会受偶然摩擦的影响。

重振加中关系将涉及全球经济和政治利益。中国的强劲经济增长推动了全球资源需求和价格上升，而中国向西方的出口骤降导致需求和价格迅速下行。对于加拿大和全球经济来说，中国快速增长的尽早恢复十分重要。

从地缘政治来说，中国成为更积极的全球参与者十分重要。无论是获取非洲或拉丁美洲的资源，还是与亚洲邻国的广泛关系，中国的外交政策大多反映对国家利益的一味追求。亚洲的军力平衡将不可避免地发生转移。美国如何反应，以及这种趋势是否会增加或削弱地区稳定，无疑是今后10年更为紧迫的外交政策问题。

在这场逐渐展开的博弈中，加拿大身处何处？置身事外或许会让我们有中立的特权，但更可能确认我们继续无足轻重的位置。为做出审慎选择，我们首先需要清楚地确定如何才能最好地服务于我们的国家和全球利益，在何种程度上我们准备在该地区做出负责任的贡献。与中国的更成熟关系将是这种平衡的关键因素。加中的人权观和政治制度不同。这些差异不能被忽视，但不应阻碍互利领域的更广泛接触。我们不必掩饰分歧，也不必“附从或磕头”，因为这是一种孩子气的想法。对于两国来说，一种更成熟的双边关系允许在人权等问题上的分歧。或许还在共同关注的全球问题上存在分歧，但这些不应该取代更广泛、更重要的经济和伙伴关系的机遇。

至关重要的是，一个日益强大的中国将如何对影响全球商贸、环境和安全的挑战做出反应。可以肯定，一个政治稳定、经济繁荣的中国攸关加拿大及其他国家的长远利益。最主要的是，对互利的务实盘算应该是主要驱动力，而不是摇摆不定的情绪。

▲（作者德里克•伯尼）前加拿大驻美国大使

加前驻美大使建言：加国必须超越幼稚的加中关系

中国新闻网/前加拿大驻美国大使本尼(Derek Burney)认为，加拿大应该放弃对自身在国际力量、地位和影响力方面的幻想，积极发展对华关系，争取在互惠互利的领域得到更多的机会，只有这样才能够保障加拿大的利益。

加拿大全国性大报《环球邮报》十一日刊发了本尼的评论文章，标题是《加拿大必须超越幼稚的加中关系》。

本尼曾任加拿大驻美大使，离职后在加国一家著名律师事务所担任顾问，并在加拿大国防部和外交部研究机构做高级研究员。本尼从政期间，还曾担任过前保守党政府总理幕僚长。

本尼在文章中分析说，加拿大的对华态度主要受到一种误判的影响，因为加拿大人排斥承认“相比于其它国家对我们的需要，我们更需要其它国家”的事实。而加拿大对华政策把贸易和人权问题纠葛在一起，也是两个问题都未能取得实质性进展的主要原因。尤其达赖喇嘛多次访加以及哈珀不参加北京奥运开幕式，更加使加中关系高度敏感起来。所以，尽管双方都表示有机会建立良好关系的基础，但合作的广度和深度仍然受到限制。

本尼认为，不可否认，中国在国际上的地位和影响力日益扩大，成为全球政治、经济、环境和安全问题上一个不可忽视的积极参与者。如果加拿大无法认清与中国建立成熟合作伙伴的重要性，则会给人“看起来坚守中立”的同时，也“愈发无关紧要”。本尼指出，加拿大必须看清自己在这场“棋赛”中的位置，清楚了解加国的利益如何能够得到最大程度的满足。

本尼在文章中引用大量数据说明，尽管过去十年来加中双边经贸往来日益频繁，但仍未赶上中国经济快速发展的步伐。而且，加拿大方面获益不大，尤其和澳大利亚相比，还有很大的差距。

本尼建议，在加中关系中的需求和如何满足这些需求上，加拿大政府应该给予一个“清晰的定义”，力图与中国“求同存异”，在不掩盖人权价值和政府体系差异的同时，从双方能够互惠互利的经贸领域出发，大力发展双边贸易。而要实现这个目标，本尼认为加拿大政府可以为加国企业创造环境，需要与中国签订一份广泛全面的经贸协定，弥补双方在经济关系中的巨大差异，促使双边关系走向一个更有活力的未来。

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE LONG VIEW

Canada must outgrow its juvenile relationship with China

Pragmatic calculation of mutual self-interest should be the driver, not the mood swings of any given day
DEREK BURNEY

April 11, 2009

Former Canadian ambassador to the United States

Canadians often shy away from asserting or acting upon their hard foreign policy interests. We tend on occasion to confuse sentiment with substance and fret that we may “need” other countries more than they need us. Conversely, we sometimes imagine that Canada is more important or has more influence than our interests and capacity warrant. Attitudes toward China suffer from all these proclivities.

The focus of Canada’s China policy has tended to concentrate somewhat erratically on the two bookends of trade and human-rights issues with not much productive dialogue on either, and with a large gap between the two. The focus of China’s Canada policy seems to be access to Canadian resources and to the Canadian market, combined with hair-trigger sensitivities about perceived insults or slights by Canada over visits by the Dalai Lama or Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s non-attendance at the Beijing Olympics. Symbolism is an element of diplomacy, but it should not displace calculations of how interests are best served.

While there is clearly potential for a more broadly gauged foundation for the relationship, there are also practical limitations to the scope of the partnership and influence that Canada can achieve with China. For one thing, any decision to engage in a more mature manner must be shared by both countries and guided systematically from the top level of both governments. The Chinese are known for taking a long view on world affairs. Canada’s long view on China should start with a more precise definition of what we wish to achieve and how.

A good place to start would be on a more substantial economic partnership. While there has been growth in two-way trade in the past decade, it has not matched the pace of China’s economic growth and has shifted dramatically in China’s favour, despite a steady stream of Team Canada, provincial and even municipal junkets to China (notably under the previous government), and this week, the visit of Stockwell Day, the Minister of International Trade, to announce the opening of five trade offices in China.

Canadian exports to China rose from $4.2-billion in 2001 to $9.5-billion in 2007, whereas Chinese exports to Canada have more than tripled in the same period, from $12.7-billion to $38.3-billion in 2007. Still, the relative percentage is tiny for both countries: roughly 2 per cent of Canada’s total exports, 3 per cent of China’s. (Over the same years, Australia’s exports to China soared from $5.2-billion to $16.4-billion. Since it does not have the luxury of the world’s largest economic power on its border, Australia is obliged to behave more strategically with its neighbours.) Governments in Canada cannot will or direct increases in trade or investment. They can, however, encourage more diversity and better use of supply chains and, more generally, they can help create an environment in which producers and entrepreneurs will thrive.

A GAP, A TREATY

A comprehensive Canada-China investment treaty would fill a serious gap in the economic relationship. Notwithstanding the pivotal role of investment in economic performance, there is no bilateral or multilateral treaty to govern Canada-China investment relations. A bilateral treaty has the potential of transforming the relationship from a neutral to a dynamic future. It would establish international standards of investment protection for Canadian investors in China. It would grant Chinese investors the right to invest in Canada, including in the resource sector, subject to the proviso that Chinese firms operate these investments on normal commercial terms. Such a treaty would encourage Canadian firms to invest in China and integrate Chinese production into their supply chains. It would give Canada new markets for resource exports.

Never forget that, because of its system of government, China can pick and choose partners for political, as well as economic, reasons. Unlike in Canada, the government in China controls all the levers of choice and makes virtually all the decisions. A Canada-China investment treaty would tell Canadian investors that the economic relationship is backed by a solid political relationship, immune from episodic frictions arising, for example, from nettlesome consular cases. As part of its plan to reduce barriers to foreign investment, the government should make a conscious effort to attract more investment from China.

There are also global economic and political interests that factor into a rejuvenated Canada-China calculus. At the top of the list is the rise of China as a major global economy and the third-largest global trader (after the European Union and the United States and ahead of Japan). Powerful economic growth in China drove global resource demand and prices relentlessly upward until a few months ago. The precipitous decline in Chinese exports to recession-stricken Western economies has driven demand and prices rapidly downward. An early resumption of rapid growth in China is critical to Canada and the global economy.

That is one reason why Canada should robustly support the full integration of China into the global institutions of economic governance. It is very much in Canada’s interest that China be accorded the status and voting power in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank that are warranted by its economic importance and potential. We should be working pragmatically with other countries to achieve this goal.

Geopolitically, it is vitally important that China become a more active global player. More often than not, China’s foreign policy reflects a single-minded pursuit of its national interest, whether it’s access to resources in Africa or Latin America or broader relations with neighbouring Asian nations, including notably Myanmar and North Korea, ostensibly to ensure greater stability in its own region.

But its neutrality on sensitive issues such as Darfur and Iran’s nuclear ambitions limits its capacity to become a more effective player in global affairs. To some extent, China has played such a role in the six-power talks over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, although the progress so far has been marginal. A real resolution, especially after last Sunday’s missile launch, hinges on decisive actions by China. China should be encouraged to play a more significant role in settling conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. Even though China borders on Afghanistan, it has been essentially detached from events in that beleaguered nation and from the threat posed more generally by extremist Islamic terrorism.

OUR PLACE IN THE GAME

China’s military expenditures are estimated to be increasing by at least 40 per cent a year, reflecting, among other things, aspirations for a full-fledged blue-water navy. India’s and Japan’s military expenditures are increasing at a slower yet still substantial pace. Inevitably, the military balance of power in Asia will shift. How the U.S. reacts and whether this trend enhances or decreases stability in the region is certain to be a more pressing foreign-policy issue for the next decade. Australia has moved to conclude a security arrangement with Japan. Japan, in turn, is forging new security links with India. The Shanghai group linking Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan adds a different dimension to the equation.

Where does Canada see itself in this evolving chess game? Standing aloof may give us the privilege of neutrality but would more likely confirm a position of continuing irrelevance. In order to make prudent choices, we need, first, a clear formulation of how our national and global interests can best be served and of the extent to which we are prepared to contribute responsibly in the region that is likely to dominate in the decades ahead. A more mature partnership with China would be a key element in that equation.

Canada has different values on human rights and a different system of government from China’s. These differences cannot be ignored but they should not hobble broader engagement in areas of mutual interest. We do not have to camouflage our differences. Nor do we have to “go along or kowtow to get along.” That is a juvenile concept that has nothing to do with fundamental foreign policy analysis. A more adult approach to the relationship by both countries would allow for honest disagreements on issues such as human rights. There may also be differences on global issues of common concern, but these should not displace the opportunity for a broader, more substantive economic and global partnership.

What is critically important, and not just to Canada, is how an increasingly powerful China responds to challenges affecting global commerce, the environment and security. Equally certain is the plain fact that Canada, among others, has critical long-term stakes in a politically stable and economically prosperous China, particularly as both would bolster China’s ability to become what Robert Zoellick, the president of the World Bank, once described as a “more responsible stakeholder” in world affairs. That in itself would be a commendable foreign-policy objective for Canada. Above all, a pragmatic calculation of mutual self-interest should be the major driver, and not the mood swings of any given day.

Derek Burney is senior strategic adviser to Ogilvy Renault and senior research

fellow for the Canadian Defence and

Foreign Affairs Institute.

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